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viii, 473. $4.
MR. Swis=eR's biography of Justice Field is valuable. It lacks qualities
which in Beveridge's Life of Marshall somehow turn faults into assets.
It is skimpy in the sort of background which humanizes the interests and
ideas to which judges react. Field himself would stand clearer if others
of the dranatis personae of his life figured as more than names-in partic-
ular, such judicial colleagues as Waite, Miller, Bradley, Harlan, and per-
haps also Gray, whom Field is said to have characterized in an unprintably
robust phrase. But I find myself uninterested in pointing out either the
faults or excellences of this careful and intelligent book-and very much
interested in Justice Field. There is precedent if not justification for
attempting, in lieu of criticism of a biography, a condensed re-statement
of its subject matter. This is a review of that sort-an outline of some
of the more striking of Field's judicial acts, attitudes and effects, with
which Mr. Swisher, though the survey does not closely follow his own and
mentions lines of cases which he omits,1 will, I think, on the whole agree.
Justice Field's forbears were Puritan ministers. His brother David
Dudley Field, under whom he got his early legal training and experience,
would be as interesting a subject for biography, as Justice Field himself:
among the clients whom he served well, though sometimes not over-scrupu-
lously, were Jay Gould and Boss Tweed; his leisure was given to the re-
form and codification of law and procedure. Another brother, Cyrus Field,
laid the Atlantic table and made much money in railways.
In 1849, at the age of thirty-three, Stephen Field migrated to California.
There he pushed himself to the top through the confusion of the Gold Rush,
and practiced law and politics with such success as to become in 1858 a
member of the Supreme Court of the state. In 1863 Congress, to tie
California to the Union and to weaken the pre-war Democratic majority
of the Supreme Court, provided for a tenth justice; Field, backed by
Leland Stanford and his brother Dudley, was appointed.2
Field sat in the Supreme Court for thirty-five years, all but connecting
the era of Taney with that of Holmes. But his significant activity, often
a dissenting one, was mainly before 1890, during the chief justiceships of
Chase and Waite.
I In locating Justice Field's more important opinions I have been greatly
helped by the use of his own collection of them, Some Opinions and Papers
of Judge Field, privately bound in six volumes, now the property of Pro-
fessor Frederick C. Hicks.
2 His subsequent career included colorful extra-judicial episodes to which
only bare allusion is here possible: his fight as a member of the Electoral
Commission" for the seating of Tilden; the effort, financed and managed
by his brothers, to make him Democratic candidate for President in 1880;
the killing by his bodyguard of his former colleague in the Supreme Court
of California, David Terry.
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The court under Waite was more "radical"--in the sense of conservative
of democratic reality-than it had ever been before or has been since.
Within ten years after Field's appointment all but one of the pre-Civil War
justices had been replaced by Republicans. Their Republicanism was that
of the Civil War period-a comparatively Jeffersonian Republicanism, ideal-
istic and humane, -with faith in a democracy that involved human dignity
and independence, substantiality of popular participation in the determina-
tion and control of public policy, reasonable if not equal opportunity for all
to obtain as well as to pursue happiness, a considerable generality of mutual
sympathy, decency, forbearance and good-will. Some of the new justices
had been lawyers for great financial interests. But practice had not yet
become specialized. They had been lawyers for ordinary men as well.
They shared the ordinary man's anxiety as to the effect upon him of indus-
trial expansion and the concentration of wealth. They were also, it is true,
more or less imbued with that sense of the glory and grandeur of our
national wealth and prosperity of which Andrew Carnegie's Trimaphant
Democraey (1586) is the naive classic expression-a feeling which, how-
ever, moderated in the six lean years following the Panic of 1873. But
they wanted the great new United States to be rather an enlargement than
a subversion of the United States in which they had grown up. That
,United States was in danger. How could it be saved without the help of
legislation? Conditions being new, legislation must be experimental. Legis-
lative power must therefore be comparatively free.
Until 1890, with exceptions noted later, nothing that could be called social
legislation was held unconstitutional. Of course the single motive sug-
gested was perhaps never the sole one, and was sometimes outweighed by
others-as doubtless in the Legal Tender Cases.3 But I am not aware that
peculiar pressures were important when later the court sustained the power
of Congress to make paper money legal tender even in the absence of such
needs as those of war 4 -a holding, in effect, that the proposal of the
Greenbackers was constitutional. Aside from acts relating to the South,
the only other important federal legislation questioned and sustained was
that provoked by the Credit Mobilier scandal; the constitutionality of the
act authorizing Federal suit to compel restitution of the spoils was, to be
sure, barren; z but the Sinking Fund Cases G sustained what Congress might
have made a drastic power to constrain and direct a privately owned fed-
eral instrumentality. The police power of the states was not only de-
scribed as comprehensive, but allowed to operate as such. Broad language,
still conventional, which in the light of its subsequent use we are now
trained to read as meaningless,i was then used as meaning what it said.
The police power was power to control and regulate the use of private
liberty and property in the public interest, as that interest was secn by the
-12 Wall. 457 (U. S. 1873) (Field, Chase, Nelson and Clifford dissented).
4 Juillard v. Greenman, 110 U. S. 451, 4 Sup. Ct. 122 (18I4) (Field
dissented).
5 United States v. Union Pacific Ry., 98 U. S. 569 (1878).
6 99 U. S. 700 (1878) (Field, Strong and Bradley dissented).
7 Field contributed to this, conceding in his dissenting opinions the ab-
stract statements of the majority, but striving to restrict their practical
application. He could say, for example, that "the harshness, injustice, and
oppressive character of laws" did not invalidate them-provided they were
within "the legitimate scope of legislative power." Missouri Pacific Ry.
v. Humes, 115 U. S. 512, 6 Sup. Ct. 110 (1885). But in the light of his
conception, discussed infra, of the "legitimate scope of legislative power,"
this was a mere jingle of words.
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legislatures. No constitutional limitation required that its exercise be rea-
sonable. The legislative duty of reasonableness was not subject to judicial
supervision. If legislation was unreasonable or oppressive, the remedy was
with the people, at the polls.8 A corporate charter was a contract of con-
stitutionally protected obligation; but no grant of remunerative privilege
therein was immune from being cut down or rescinded by the legislature
in the exercise of its police power. It would be ultra vires the legislature
to contract away its police power
The social legislation held unconstitutional was Reconstruction legisla-
tion.30 But here again the court was conservative of democratic reality.
For democratic local control of local affairs could have no substance if,
through Acts of Congress, the interests of so important a part of the
people of the South as the ex-Confederates could be denied expression,
The stepping-stone to the vacation of federal Reconstruction legislation,
or its attrition by construction, was the majority decision in the Slaughter
House Cases "-which, sustaining an unconscionable local regulation against
the claim that the "iights of man" which it invaded were protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment as privileges or immunities of national citizenship,
was virtually a holding that that amendment, if construed as intended
by its draftsmen, would unconstitutionally subvert the American system.
As to the specific policy of local autonomy in the South, Field agreed with the
majority; indeed he had wished to start earlier,2 and wanted to go fur-
ther.13 Yet in his dissent in the Slaughter House Cases he claimed a
federal judicial power to protect the people from their own state govern-
ments quite as revolutionary as the enlarged federal legislative power which
in other cases he agreed with the court in denying. It may be permissible
s Slaughter House Cases, 16 Wall. 36 (U. S. 1873) (Field, Bradley,
Swayne and Chase dissented); the Granger Cases-Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.
S. 113 (1876) and cases following (Field and Strong dissented); Powell
v. Pennsylvania, 127 U. S. 678, 8 Sup. Ct. 992 (1887) (Field dissented).
The Slaughter House legislation was pretty surely vicious; the Granger
rate legislation was impressionistic and much of it probably "confiscatory;"
the outlawry of oleomargarine was at least a questionable legislative policy.
9 The railway rate group of Granger Cases, supra note 8; Butcher's
Union Co. v. Crescent City Co., 111 U. S. 746, 4 Sup. Ct. 652 (1883).
Field's differences with the majority were as to the scope of the police
power; see also his dissents in the Spring Valley and Railroad Commission
cases, infra notes 27 and 29. In other respects he went as far as anyone in
shaving down Marshall's conception of immunity under the contract clause;
see cases collected and cited in THAYER, CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
(1896) 1678-1782.
10 United States v. Reese, 92 U. S. 214 (1876) ; United States v. Harris,
106 U. S. 629, 1 Sup. Ct. 601 (1883); Civil Rights Cases, 109 U. S. 616, 3
Sup. Ct. 18 (1883) ; of. United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U. S. 542 (1875);
Virginia v. Rives, 100 U. S. 313 (1879).
1 Supra note 8.
12 He joined in Grier's hot protest at the court's resignation to losing its
opportunity to pass upon Reconstruction legislation in the McCardle Case.
SWISHER, STEPHEN J. FIELD 160-161.
13 He dissented in the cases finding jury laws and usages discriminatory
against negroes. Ex parte Virginia, 100 U. S. 339 (1879); Strauder v.
West Virginia, ibid. 303. Also from the holding that state election officers
could be made punishable by Act of Congress for misconduct in Con-
gressional elections. Ex parte Siebold, ibid. 371; Ex parte Clarke, ibid.
399, 404.
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to wonder whether he would then have advanced that claim had the ques-
tion been of protecting carpet-baggers from state laws inspired by ex-
Confederates instead of vice-versa.
Other holdings of unconstitutionality gave stringent efficacy to specific con-
stitutional guaranties of popular personal liberties,14 including the guaranty
of due process of law in its "definite meaning" of due procedure in the en-
forcement of law." Field was a leader and frequent spokesman of the court
in the protection of such liberties, dissenting from any relaxation of pro-
cedural safe-guards under pressure -of natural impatience with their ten-
dency to obstruct substantial justice.16 In the first labor injunction case
which reached the Supreme Court he wrote the opinion holding that the
complainant had an adequate remedy, if he were entitled to any, at law,
and that there was no jurisdiction in equity.17 He read into the due process
clause the doctrine-which had had theretofore to rest upon general princi-
ples of the nature of sovereignty-that state power might not constitution-
ally, even when it might physically do so with benign results, operate be-
yond the geographical boundaries of the state. 8 To protect a more vital
liberty-that from oppression because of race-in Chinese, though not in
negro, cases he blew away the fair surface of enactments and denied effect
to covert discriminatory legislative intentions.'0
In personal liberty cases Field's devotion to democratic values was deep
and real.' When he differed from the majority of the court, the difference
was not in kind but in degree. The same is doubtless true of his difference
in property cases; but his angle of departure from the line of the majority
in such cases was much wider-perhaps 90° or more, sometimes approach-
ing 1800. In the Supreme Court of California his main work had been to
draw a holy circle of protection for the few more far-sighted adventurers
1A Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall. 277 (U. S. 1867); Ex parte Garland,
ibid. 333 (both per Field, for a court divided five to four, holding test oaths
unconstitutional); Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616, 6 Sup. Ct. 524
(1886) (unconstitutional self-crimination, search and seizure) ; Ex parte
Robinson, 19 Wall. 505 (1873) (per Field, reversal of summary disbarment
for contempt); Callan v. Wilson, 127 U. S. 540, 8 Sup. Ct. 1301 (1888)
(jury trial); Kilburn v. Thompson, 103 U. S. 168 (1881) (no power in
Congress to punish a witness for not answering 4questions as to niatters
with respect to which it was held that Congress had no business to inquire) ;
cf. In re Pacific Ry. Comm., 32 Fed. 241 (1887), where Field relieved Leland
Stanford from explaining the disposition bf a "slush fund."
"Ex parte Milligan, 4 'all. 1 (1867) ; Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714
(1877) (decision by Field).
:16 Ex parte Wall, 107 U. S. 265, 2 Sup. Ct. 569 (1882) (Field thought
that a lawyer summarily disbarred for participation in a lynching had
not had due process); Lawton v. Steele, 152 U. S. 133, 14 Sup. Ct. 133
(1894) (his dissent, with Fuller and Brewer, was from a decision sustain-
ing a statute authorizing destruction of illegal fish nets without any pro-
cedure).
17 Francis v. Flinn, 118 U. S. 385, 6 Sup Ct. 1148 (1886).
1 Pennoyer v. Neff, supra note 15; State Tax on Foreign Held Bonds, 15
Wall. 300 (1872) (a five to four decision); Western Union v. Pendleton,
122 U. S. 347, 7 Sup. Ct. 1126 (1386); cf. O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U. S. 323,
12 Sup. Ct. 693 (1892); the extra-territoriality of the crime was one of
the grounds of Field's dissent from a decision sustaining what amounted
to a life sentence for shipping liquor from New York into Vermont.
-9 SWISHE, STEPHEN J. FELD c. 8. The theory of his Circuit decisions
was adopted in Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356, 6 Sup. Ct. 1064 (1886).
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against squatters who had carelessly assumed that vast vacant areas were
in truth, as they seemed, no man's land, or any man's-validating paper
titles under more or less convincing claims of Mexican grants.20 In the
Supreme Court of the United States his main dissenting force was toward
setting up a definite super-constitutional immunity of private property
from regulation in the public interest. He denied that any public interest,
save in life under circumstances as of war or earthquake, could have prior-
ity.2' "Where property is insecure, the rights of persons are unsafe. Pro-
tection to the one goes with protection to the other; and there can be
zeither prosperity nor progress where either is uncertain." 22 He resolutely
'refused to weigh-or even to see--facts tending to compel qualification of
his dogmatic assumption.
His claims were on occasion frankly super-constitutional. "For acts of
flagrant injustice such as those mentioned [legislation requiring that a ten
cent dollar be accepted at face value] there is no authority in any legislative
body, even though not restrained by any express constitutional prohibition.
For as there are unchangeable principles of right and morality, without
which society would be impossible, and men would be but wild beasts prey-
ing upon each other, so there are fundamental principles of eternal justice,
upon the existence of which all constitutional government is founded, and
without which government would be an intolerable and hateful tyranny. 23a
Acceptance by the Pacific railways of the conditions of the Acts of Congress
in aid of their construction-acceptance actually of liberal benefits-con-
stituted, he thought, a contract; from private rights vested thereunder the
federal government could not, even in the interest of the honesty and sol-
vency of the railways, subtract. That no constitutional provision forbade
federal impairment of the obligation of contract was immaterial; it was
enough that there was no power expressly given so to invade inalienable
rights of man.24
His practical effort, however, was to fix for legislative power limits much
more definite than a mere variable inference from "unchangeable principles
of right and morality" and "fundamental principles of eternal justice." His
20 SWISHER, STEPHEN J. FIELD 82 et seq. He was following the prece-
dents, made in Louisiana and Florida cases, as to which see Nelles and King,
Gontempt by Publication (1928) 28 COL. L. Rnv. 401, 423 et deq.
The contrasting realism of Field's analysis and valuation of interests
when property absolutism was not involved was strikingly illustrated in
another California case, Ex paite Newman, 9 Cal. 502 (1858). The ques-
tion was of the constitutionality of a Sunday law. The reasoning of Terry,
then Chief Justice, was used later by Field in such cases as Powell v.
Pennsylvania, supra note 8. "A pursuit," said Terry, "which is . . . law-
ful... for six days in the week" cannot "be arbitrarily converted into a...
misdemeanor on the seventh. Men have a natural right to do anything
-which their inclination may suggest, if ib... in no way impairs the rights of
others." To Field, dissenting, the protection of labor from the power of
capital seemed "the highest office of our laws;" moreover, "it is not for the
judiciary to pass upon the wisdom and policy of legislation." This opinion
is moie fully quoted, SWISHER, STEPHEN J. FIELD 77 et seq.
21 Munn v. Illinois, supra note 8.
22Address to N. Y. State Bar Association, Feb. 4, 1890, 2 Som. OPINIONS
AND PAPERS OF JUDGE Finup, supra note 1, at No. 28.
23 Dissenting in the Legal Tender Cases, supra note 3, at 670. See Cot-
win, The "Higher Law" Background of American Constitutional Law (1928-
29) 42 HA/v. L. R.v. 149, 365.
24 Dissenting in the Sinking Fund Cases, supra note 6, at 762.
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working definition of the police power was a specification of permissible
legislative objects: public health, peace, morals, education, good order, in-
crease of industries, development of resources, and addition to wealth and
prosperity. -  His more abstract statement in Munn v. Illinois 2 allowed
the legitimacy of "legislation which secures to all protection in their rights,
and the equal use and enjoyment of their property." This was immediately
qualified, however, by the limitation: "Whatever affects the peace, good
order, morals and health of society, comes within its scope.... What is
termed the police power of the state, which, from the language often used
respecting it, one would suppose to be an undefined irresponsible element
in government, can only interfere with the conduct of individuals in their
intercourse with each other, and in the use of their property, so far as may
be required to secure these objects." And since Munn and Scott's ware-
houses "are not nuisances" ("their occupation of receiving and storing grain
infringes upon no rights of others, disturbs no neighborhood, infects not
the air"), the rate regulation in question "is nothing less than a bold asser-
tion of absolute power by the State to contract at discretion the property
and business of the citizen." In all his essays toward comprehensive defini-
tion of the police power the phrase "general welfare" is conspicuous by its
absence. Man by the social contract had granted to government no such
roving commission. A state could obtain the power to regulate the rates
of a public utility only by express stipulation in consideration of some
special privilege which the state had a right to withhold, such as incorpora-
tion, monopoly, or eminent domain; neither the grant of privilege without
express reservation of regulatory power nor the existence of virtual monop-
oly would support the power.2 7 He long denied that the decisions from
which he dissented had established regulatory power-finally conceding it
with respect only to public utilities which had received from the state con-
sideration which would support a power of regulation as upon a theory
of implied contract.28 But this was not until it had become clear that the
court, largely over-ruling Munn v. Illinois, would hold that the reasonable-
ness of rates is a judicial question and that unreasonable rate regulation
is a deprivation of property without due process of law.2 He stood fast to
2 Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U. S. 27, 31, 5 Sup. Ct. 357, 359 (1885). He
was not illiberal in seeing legislation as reasonably related to one of these
definite objects. Barbier v. Connolly, supra; Soon Hing v. Crowley, 113 U.
S. 703, 5 Sup. Ct. 730 (1885) (in which Mr. Swisher sees inconsistency
with his concern to protect Chinese from discrimination); Missouri Pacific
Ry. v. Humes, supra note 7; Minneapolis & St. Louis Ry. v. Beckwith, 129
U. S. 26, 9 Sup. Ct. 207 (1888); Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U. S. 114,
9 Sup. Ct. 232 (1888) ; Crowley v. Christenson, 137 U. S. 86, 11 Sup. Ct. 13
(1890). See also the cases in which the question was one of interference
with interstate commerce or a federal instrumentality: Welton v. Missouri,
91 U. S. 275 (1875); Tiernan v. Rinker, 93 U. S. 123 (1870); Webber v.
Virginia, 103 U. S. 344 (1881); Sherlock v. Alling, 93 U. S. 99 (1876);
Mobile v. Kimball, 102 U. S. 691 (1880) ; Bridge Co. v. United States, 105
U. S. 489 (1881); Escanaba Co. v. Chicago, 107 U. S. 678, 2 Sup. Ct. 185
(1882) ; Miller v. Mayor of New York, 109 U. S. 385, 3 Sup. Ct. 228 (1883);
Huse v. Glover, 119 -U. S. 543, 7 Sup. Ct. 313 (1886).2 6 Supra note 8, at 145, 148.
-7 Dissents in Granger Cases, supra note 8, and in Spring Valley Water
Works v. Schatker, 110 U. S. 347, 4 Sup. Ct. 48 (1884).
28 Georgia Railroad & Banking Co. v. Smith, 128 U. S. 174, 9 Sup. Ct. 4'T
(1888); Charlotte, C. & A. Ry. v. Gibbes, 142 U. S. 386, 12 Sup. Ct. 256
(1892).
29 Railroad Commission Cases, 116 U. S. 307, 331, 6 Sup. Ct. 334, 335.
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the end against the "loose" doctrine that the mere fact of helpless depend-
ence of a large public upon a private business which competition had ceased
to regulate gave the state power to do so. 30
On the surface, his bows to the state power of limiting and regulating
corporations may seem inconsistent with his sense of the sanctity of prop-
erty. But it was as a party Democrat that he stood for "strict construction"
and state's rights. His concern for them was always subordinate to his
concern for property absolutism, even though subversive of democratic
reality, and for federal judicial power in aid of it. In the interstate com-
merce cases in which he wrote, conflict between these two concerns was not
importantly involved; although his decisions marked some enlargement of
the federal preserve, they offended no popular interest; and he showed in
them genuine desire for a sensible coordination of federal immunity with
state power which would not result in a lacuna of power as to matters
which, within his narow conception of the legitimate bounds of legislative
power, demanded the attention of some government.31
The state power over corporations which Field most vigorously main-
tained has been in fact rather a constitutional nuisance than a power of
much practical importance. A corporation is not a "citizen," it is an
"artificial person"; only natural persons can be citizens. A corporatiou
of one state is not, therefore, entitled to the privileges and immunities of
citizens in other states. A state may condition or forbid the business of a
foreign corporation within its borders for any reason or for no reason.
Field was the right arm of the court in maintaining through the second
half of the nineteenth century this product of the metaphysical and prac-
tical ingenuity of Marshall and Taney.3 2 He supported it upon the practical
ground that since incorporation is a special privilege and not a right of
man, state legislatures might limit, forbid, or regulate grants of incorpora-
tion as they deemed conducive to the best interests of the state--a power
which would, however, be useless if they could not exclude or regulate
corporations of other states.33 In practice in Field's time the special
privilege of incorporation could actually, under general incorporation laws,
be obtained and abused by any Tom, Dick and Harry. The possibility,
doubtless always remote, of any .state's making substantial fruitful use of
its power of restrictive regulation of corporate enterprise was destroyed by
the decisions divesting the power with respect to foreign coporations in
(1886) ; Dow v. Beidleman, 125 U. S. 180, 8 Sup. Ct. 1028 (1888) ; Chicago,
Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. v. Minnesota, 134 U. S. 418, 10 Sup. Ct. 702
(1890).
30 Concurring in Brewer's dissenting opinions in Budd v. New York, 143
U. S. 517, 12 Sup. Ct. 468 (1892) and Brass v. Stoeser, 153 U. S. 391, 14
Sup. Ct. 857 (1894). In the Spring Valley Water Works case, supra note 27,
he argued that the mere fact that a company owned the water supply of San
Francisco did not make it a monopoly, for any five persons might lawfully
incorporate a competing water company.
31 In addition to interstate commerce cases cited supro, note 25, see cases
in THAYER, op. cit. supra note 9, at 1909-2190. For evidence in interstate
commerce ,cases of his desire to limit legislative power it is necessary to
examine his votes in cases in which he did not write an opinion. le con-
curred in the emasculation of federal regulation of interstate corporations
by the first great decision under the Sherman Act: United States v. E. C.
Knight Co., 156 U. S. 1, 15 Sup. Ct. 249 (1895).
32 HENDERSON, THE POSITION OF FOREIGN CORPORATIONS IN AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1918) c. 3-7.
3 3 Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall, 168 (U. S. 1868).
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interstate commerce. For an essential prerequisite of effective regulation
of economic conditions in a state is power to reach the great corporations
which operate in many states; their transactions have no less effect within a
state when, instead of both, only one of the termini is local. In the first
case emasculating state power as to such corporations Field fired dissent-
ing guns 3 4--which, however, for once he did not stand by. Little remained
of absolute state power over foreign corporations except, while Field sur-
vived, power to subject them to discriminatory taxation for the privilege
of doing such business as was wholly intrastate.33
Neither was the content which Field allowed to the power of a state
with respect to its domestic corporations very substantial. The state could
tax their franchises rather ferociously. 33 Field held, however, that the
property of the Southern Pacific could not be assessed or taxed otherwise
than as other property in California was assessed and taxed-defeating
the effort of a reform movement to end a notoriously corrupt immunity
from taxation.37 The state could, of course, determine on what terms
and conditions it would grant privileges of incorporation in the first in-
stance. And having granted charters, it could, provided it had reserved
such power, alter or amend them-at least to the extent of changing their
phraseology. But insofar as property and specific powers or immunities
of money-making value were granted by charter or acquired by corpora-
tions subsequently, Field contended that they could not be divested without
violation of the rights of man. Corporations, not being men, had no such
rights themselves; but the natural persons behind them had.- s
As against the inalienable right of man to get all he can and keep
all he can get, Field could see the interest of men generally only as spolia-
tive and predatory. He was clearly aware of the problems of the time:
that with increase of property and wealth "the inequalities in the condition
of men become more marked and disturbing;" that "enormous aggrega-
tion of wealth possessed by some corporations excites uneasiness lest their
power should become dominating in the legislatures of the country and
thus encroach upon the rights and crush out the business of individuals
of small means." But though private power over-shadowing governmcnt
was so fixing the conditions of men as constantly to depreciate the value
of their equal privilege to pursue happiness, he could not conceive legisla-
tive power as extending to prevention or remedy. The lesson of unrest
was simply this: as unrest increases "it becomes more and more the impera-
tive duty of the court" unhesitatingly to enforce "constitutional" guaranties
of private rights.3-
His reference was to a super-constitutional immunity of private, includ-
ing corporate, property from regulation in the public interest as conceived
by legislatures. "Constitutional" protection of this super-constitutional im-
34 Pensacola Telegraph Co. v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 96 U. S. 1
(1877). Field was moved by the fact that the decision admitting the
Western Union into Florida destroyed the property of the local company
in its statutory monopoly; it would seem that he would have been likely
to have dissented in Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1 (U. S. 1824).
-
5 Pembina Mining Co. v. Pennsylvania, 125 U. S. 181, 8 Sup. Ct. 737
(1888).
36 Home Life Insurance Co. v. New York, 184 U. S. 594, 10 Sup. Ct. 593
(1889).
3
7 SWISHER, STEPHEN J. FIELD c. 9.
31 Dissents in Spring Valley Waters Works case, supra note 27, and in
Stone v. Wisconsin, 94 U. S. 181, 183 (1876).
39 Address, supra note 22.
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reunity had been a definite object in his participation in the forging of a
new constitutional instrument-perhaps not yet at the time of the Slaughter
House Cases, but surely later. The ultimate "construction" of the due
process clause as meaning that legislation may not be "arbitrary" and must
be "reasonable" was flagrant forgery. For it is not a construction of the
words "deprive of liberty or property without due process of law." It de-
pends upon a construction of the word "law." From Field's assumption
that the power of legislatures to make law is subject to super-constitutional
limitation it follows that legislative "acts of flagrant injustice" are not law.
Since they are not law, they cannot be enforced by any procedure, duo or
undue. But it is because they are not law that they are void-not because
they do anything "without due process of law." And the law by which
they are not law is not the Constitution, but the "higher law" variously
seated in various judicial consciousnesses.
.Until the end of Field's time the court shrank from the enormity of in-
corporating this "higher law" into the due process clause by force of sheer
assertion, striving, or instance, to explain its ultimate holding that Im-
position of unreasonable rates is a deprivation of property without due
process of law as a holding of unconstitutionality, not for substantive un-
reasonableness, but for procedural undueness in denying judicial hearing
upon the question of unreasonableness. 40 Field himself would obviously
have preferred the linguistically more plausible incorporation of the "higher
law" into the Constitution which he proposed in the Slaughter House Casrs-
by assertion that the "unalienable rights" with which man is endowed by
Nature or Nature's God are "privileges and immunities of citizens of the
United States." Failing in that, however, he became assiduous, sometimes
with and sometimes without Bradley's assistance, in claiming immunity for
inalienable rights under the due process clause. The pressure succeeded, not
by convincing reason, but through failure of opposition. For twenty odd
years following the first launching of the idea in the court by Bradley and
Swayne in 1873,41 though it was not accepted, no justice went on record
as rejecting it. In Munn v. Illinois, for example, Waite largely conceded
by not denying Field's abstract contention as to judicial power. Some
early "authority" f9 r it was to be found in cases where judicial indignation
at the boiling point could find no other reed to lean upon.42 The Waite
court itself made an authority for super-constitutional power on "general
principles." 43 But objections to such naked super-constitutionalism were
obvious, and might become clamorous. 44 Yet the possibility of a power
with which so much justice could be done (no judge of course would feel
that he could not be trusted with it) was constantly seductive. It was re-
pelled only for want of respectable constitutional vestments. But time and
iteration made the due process clause seem a sufficient covering.4
Though it would be undue to claim for Field alone the credit or discredit
of this achievement, no other judge has higher title to It. In this, and in
40 See supra, note 29.
4 1 Dissenting in the Slaighter House Cases, supra note 8.
42 Corwin, The Doctrine of Due Process of Law Before the Civil War
(1911) 24 HARv. L. REv. 366, 460.
4Loan Association v. Topeka, 20 Wall. 655 (U. S. 1875), holding void
municipal bonds issued to induce a factory to locate in Topeka. The court
claimed its "general principles" power only under state constitutions.
Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U. S. 97 (1878).
44 See Clifford's dissent in the Topeka case, supra note 43.
4For details of the development see Corwin, The Supreme C6urt and the
Fourteenth Amendment (1909), 7 MicII. L. Rnv. 643.
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the use to be made of it, his significance is as a precurser. Except indeed
for his interstate commerce decisions, most of what he wrote into the
Constitution in his own time with his own hand has become comparatively
unimportant. His most important contemporary force was of resistance. In
stressing at the beginning the Jeffersonianism of his colleagues I probably
exaggerated it. Probably there was never much chance that the tendency
of decision would be on from, instead of back fro.m, Munn v. Illinois. What
chance there was Field prevented. He kept his colleagues aware that
their prepossessions, their sympathies, their values and convictions were
on the whole pretty much as his. Such leaven of social concern as was
working in some of them was working incoherently. A mystic faith in
right and rights, somehow established otherwise than by human power,
with sanctions somehow higher than those of human use and benefit, was
all but universal in a generation endoctrinated not only with the Declara-
tion of Independence but also with the Word of God. To set up an intcrc t,
even of mankind, against a right of man, had a connotation as of time-
serving. To contradict the majestic nonsense of Field's abstract conceptions
would have been a heresy which no pragmatic faith was yet confident enough
to hazard. His unswerving insistence-lucid, eloquent, ev'en, granting his
premises, logical-upon the True Word was a tremendous drag against
movement in the direction of uncouth social forces. That he was a judge
in whose dependability railway magnates could in correspondence between
themselves express their confidence - did not lessen his weight. It was no
disgrace-provided the dependability was not felt as a bought commodity
and did not involve submission to dictation. And dfter the somewhat Jeffer-
sonian Republicanism engendered in the Civil War period had spent itself,
what other sort of judge was likely often to be appointed?
Field held back the Jeffersonianism of the Waite court until it Vas dead,
and lived to see the "higher law" not only established in the Constitution
but also used as he desired, and, I think, thought that he thought right.
Chief Justice Fuller made law of his dissenting doctrine that state power
to enforce prohibition cannot abridge the inalienable right of a lawful
owner of alcoholic property in another state to sell it across state lines :-
a state of law but for which national prohibition might never have seemed
important. The income tax of 1893 was held unconstitutional 49 compatibly
with his dissenting opinions in the Legal Tender and Sinking Fund cases.49
He was still a member of the court when, in AUgcycr v. Louisiaiza, it was
clearly established, through Justice Peckham, that it is deprivation of libcrty
or property without due process of law to abridge the rights of man. It
would be excessive to imply that the subsequent tendency of decision with
respect to social legislation, largely subverting the "right"l of men in
general to a voice in their own destiny, was a personal victory for Field. But
the judicial barricade against popular government may owe more to his exer-
tions than to those of any other single member of the court since Marshall.
Yet, whatever may be thought of his works, he is not a repulsive figure.
The specific measures against which he fulminated were usually open to
just criticisms. Deprecation of the long-run tendency of his pressure
46 SWISHER, STEPHEN J. FIELD 247.
47 Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U. S. 100, 10 Sup. Ct. 681 (1890). Cf. Field's
dissent in MIugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 623, 675, 8 Sup. Ct. 273, 304 (1887).
1- Pollock v. Farmers' Loan and Trust Co., 157 U. S. 429, 15 Sup. Ct. 673
(1895); 158 U. S. 601, 15 Sup. Ct. 912 (1895). Field wrote a concurring
opinion.
49 Supra notes 3 and 6.
50 165 U. S. 578, 17 Sup. Ct. 427 (1897).
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springs in part from a traditional faith in popular government whose
validity is no longer self-evident. Jefferson would not have owned him
as a democrat. But he was never cold; he was always mighty; and, except
when hardener by his bigotries, he was not inhumane.51
New Haven, Conn. WALTER NELLS.
Social Control of Sex Expression. By Geoffrey May. New
York, William Morrow & Co., 1931. pp. xi, 307. $3.
MR. MAY gives in this painstaking study a detailed history of the control
of sexual behavior by Anglo-American law. It is a work which has long
been needed. In most of the great encyclopedic studies of sex and family
organization some consideration is devoted to the problem investigated in
this volume, but such accounts are at best fragmentary. Mr. May, in
studying in detail the history of the legal control of sex expression, has
done a fresh and original piece of work.
The book begins with an analysis of the methods of sexual control existing
among primitive peoples. In primitive societies chastity is not regarded,
as in some more advanced societies, as an ideal which has a value apart
from other factors; it rests upon what the author terms a "property" and a
"contamination" basis. In communities where woman is considered the
property of man, virginity, for reasons which are still obscure, is regarded
as a thing of value, and a father will have to accept a materially reduced
bride-price if his daughter has lost her chastity. A belief common among
primitive peoples is that woman has a contaminating or devitalizing effect
upon man. From this idea grew the many superstitions which attribute
to woman the failure of crops, the occurrence of disease and even defeat in
battle. The concept of woman as a chattel and the fear of her supposedly
magical qualities were especially important among the ancient Hebrews;
in addition, the concept of monotheism was so tenaciously held that any
intimacy between an Israelite and the follower of another god was re-
garded as an injury to the Hebrew god, a belief which naturally resulted
in a condemnation of the forms of sex expression peculiar to other tribes as
heretical. Nevertheless, the sexual morality of the early Hebrews was
condemned for its laxity by the Pharisees and the Essenes; and their
ethical precepts, mingling with the Platonic doctrine of sex and other in-
fluences, culminated finally in the early Christian' denunciation of all forms
of sexual relationship as mortal sins. This conception of the Christian
fathefs, with slight modifications, was finally carried over into English law.
Before the end of the thirteenth century the ecclesiastical courts had
complete jurisdiction over the sexual life of the people and with the codifi-
-. One of the most striking evidences that he could feel humble human
interests as well as property interests as rights is his hostility to the
"fellow servant rule" in personal injury cases. For a time he suc-
ceeded in getting a divided court to accept the "vice principal" qualifica-
tion of that rule. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. v. Ross, 112 U. S.
377 5 Sup. Ct. 184 (1884). He dissented warmly when the court con-
strued the substance out of this qualification, and imposed its harsher doe-
,trine on the federal courts as "general law" which they must apply even in
states whose courts rejected it-somewhat anticipating Justice Holmes'
dissenting opinions on "general law" questions. Baltimore & .Ohio Ry. v.
Baugh, 149 U. S. 368, 13 Sup..Ct
.
914 (19.3),.
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cation of the canon law the traditions of the Christian doctrines of sexual
morality secured a firmer hold on English jurisprudence. It is at this
point that the real value and usefulness of Mr. May's study become
apparent. In the greatest detail he traces the vicissitudes of the legal con-
trol of sexual behavior in England from the Conquest, and in America from
pre-revolutionary times, to the present day. The story that he tells is not
a pleasant one. It ranges from the complete collapse of morality among
the clergy at the time of the Reformation, and the creation of the Court
of High Commission by Elizabeth in an effort to regulate the sex life of
the people, to the last unsuccessful attempt in Parliament in the nineteenth
century to make adultery criminally punishable by fine and imprisonment.
In colonial America the laws governing sexual conduct varied from the
comparatively lenient provisions of Virginia, Delaware and Pennsylvania to
the harsh enactments of Massachusetts Bay where three persons were
executed for adultery.
The talents the author displays in recounting social history are, however,
not evident when he ventures, in the concluding chapter of the volume, into
the realm of social theory. Mr. May concludes from his survey of the
manifestations of sexual behavior throughout the centuries and the at-
tempts of society through law to control it, that legal methods of con-
trolling such behavior have been various, and that the Patristic concep-
tions of sexual morality were the foundations of the moral standards of
Western Europe. There is, of course, no element of novelty in either of
these conclusions; but it is to Mr. May's credit that he has traced with
such precision the attempts and failures of law to enforce the indefensible
ideal of chastity advocated by Ambrose and Jerome, by Augustine and
Clement of Alexandria. Having established that the regulation of sexual
behavior by legal control is almost impossible, he asks the important ques-
tion: why should the law have continued to maintain the Patristic doc-
trine of chastity? "Why has the question of morality," he writes, "entered
into a voluntary sexual connection which does not injure the two persons
taking part in it or any third person, and which, moreover, can do no
injury to the child which may be engendered by it? The answer is, that
though no individual may suffer by voluntary non-marital sex expression,
society conceives itself to be suffering. It is losing potential strength."
Mr. May is here, it would appear, attempting to rationalize legal history
by showing that the condemnation by the law of certain forms of sexual
activity had, in reality, its origin in a belief that the particular forms were
anti-social. Yet he shows they were first denounced by Catholic theologians
as mortal sins and that as a result of their condemnation by canon law
they were gradually secularized into crimes or public wrongs. Nowhere
does Mr. May show that after the secularization of these modes of conduct
as crimes their continued condemnation by the law was the result of the
belief that they were anti-social. The evidence offered in the body of the
book supports the conclusion that, having once been established as crimes,
they were continued to be regarded as such by the law through inertia,
unreasoning respect for authority, and an unwillingness to examine facts
in a critical spirit.
But the weakness of the author's concluding chapter does not invalidate
his principal thesis or affect the value of his book as a whole. He has
set forth the history of the Anglo-American legal control of sexual behavior
with great adeptness and penetration, and the laborious spadework evident
throughout the volume distinguishes it, on this point alone, as a contribu-





Cases on the Law of Insurance. By William Reynolds Vance,
Second Edition. St. Paul, West Publishing Co., 1931. pp.
xxiii, 1020. $6.
PROFESSOR VANCE'S new edition of his Cases on Insurance represents a
complete overhauling of his first edition which appeared seventeen years
ago. Many of the cases appearing in the former edition have been sup-
planted by others of recent date. Several old chapters have been completely
reorganized and a few new ones added. This has been done at the cost of
275 additional pages, but the result is worth the price.
An important addition is a section on risk bearing and risk distribution,
containing a classification of risks and a discussion of the theory of insur-
ance. Another addition is a chapter on the state control of the insurance
business, including cases bearing on the public character of insurance. It
may be questioned whether most of this matter should not have been
left to a course in public utilities, especially since the strictly
insurance material more than consumes the time usually available for
the course. Still, completeness requires more than passing notice of this
important topic. Of much importance is the new chapter on premiums,
covering such matters as the nature of the obligation to pay premiums, time
and mode of payment, the requirement of notice and the right to a return
of premiums. A new chapter of 140 pages is devoted to accident insurance,
an addition well justified in view of the tremendous growth of this type
of insurance during the last decade. Liability, guaranty, title, theft, credit,
reciprocal and group insurance are given recognition in a separate chapter.
The chapters on waiver and estoppel and on the rights of the various parties
under both life and fire policies are completely reorganized and enlarged.
The result is a material improvement over the same chapters in the old
edition. Other valuable features of the book include the stating of stimulat-
ing problems and questions in the footnotes, the unlocking of the mine of
magazine material by frequent citation of articles, notes and comments, and
the occasional sifting into the cases of material on certain economic aspects
of insurance.
Professor Vance adheres to his former plan of developing both life and
property insurance together. This seems amply justified in waiver and
estoppel, and perhaps also in concealment, representations and warranties,
but it may be questioned whether in other respects the two types of in-
surance are not sufficiently different in function and in operation to justify
separate treatment. For example, matters affecting delivery of the policy,
though still important in life insurance, have come to be of little or no im-
portance in fire insurance; matters of insurable interest, though related,
are quite distinct in operation and effect in the two fields; although the con-
sequences of a failure of a condition are, probably the same in different
kinds of insurance, the facts which constitute conditions are entirely differ-
ent, and most controversies hinge upon the latter; the content of the rights
and powers of the various parties in the two types are quite dissimilar;
the interest of the beneficiary in life insurance has no counterpart in prop-
erty insurance, and the interests of such third parties as mortgagees, bailees,
vendees, remaindermen, etc., have no counterpart in life insurance; problems
involving prorating, concurrent insurance, co-insurance, blanket and specific
policies, etc., arise only in property insurance; and of course, the facts con-
stituting maturity are quite distinct in all branches of insurance. In view
of this cleavage, is not a student likely to acquire a more impressive picture
of the function and operation of life insurance, for example, if his pur-
suit of that subject is not interrupted by too frequent excursions into the
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fields of fire, marine or liability insurance? Of course it is not meant that
analogies from various insurance fields may not frequently be used to
advantage. But is there not a certain atmosphere and technique peculiar
to life insurance that can more likely be sensed if the student's association
-with the subject is intimate and continuous? However that may be, it
seems certain that a more logical and convenient classification of material is
possible if the various branches of the subject are kept separate. A sensi-
ble classification of insurance material is a difficult job under any circum-
tances. With all 'branches considered together, it is an impossibility.
An examination of Professor Vance's book reveals some of these diffi-
culties. For example, there is a chapter dealing with "rights under a
fire policy." Another chapter deals with "construction" of the fire policy.
An examination of the contents of these chapters reveals that the first deals
-with construction of the policy as well as "rights" of the parties, and the
second with "rights" of the parties as well as the construction of the policy.
The only difference is that one chapter "construes" one group of clauses
and the other chapter "construes" another group of clauses, and that the
first chapter deals with the rights and powers of the insured and such
parties as mortgagees and bailees, and the other deals with the rights
and powers of the insurer. The life policy is dealt with in the same way.
But far be it from me to criticise a classification merely because it is
not "logical." The test ought to be, is it convenient, and it may be that
Professor Vance's classification is the most convenient if not the most
"logical." As to whether it is possible to attain the latter in the organiza-
tion of insurance material is doubtful. However that may be, Professor
Vance has done better than anyone else who has undertaken the task.
This book is one of great merit, evidencing much painstaking research
and thought. The addition of new topics, the reorganization of old chapters,
the free use of recent eases, the enrichment of the footnotes with problems
and magazine references, and the occasional insertion of extra-legal ma-
terial combine to make of Professor Vance's new edition a teaching tool of
the highest order.
Urbana, Ill. GEoRGcE W. GOBL .
Law and Literature and Other Essays awd Addresses. By Ben-
jamin N. Cardozo, New York, Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1931.
pp. 190. $2.75.
TIS little volume contains seven of the graceful and charming essays for
which the distinguished Chief Judge of the New York Court of Appeals is
famous. Originally delivered as addresses, they are not, of course, of the
epoch-making quality of his lectures on the judicial process. They do,
however, give an intimate and revealing picture of the man himself and
will be especially welcome to his many friends for this reason.
The first essay on "Law and Literature" was delivered before the Har-
vard Law School Association and the Connecticut Bar Association and is
reprinted from the Yale Review. In it he discusses, not without humor
mixed with many shrewd conclusions and suggestions, various types of
judicial opinions and arguments at the bar. Lawyers may obtain many a
hint to aid them in addressing appellate courts if they will study this with
care. The judge's conclusion that legal writings may also be literature is
one which his own work outstandingly exemplifies.
The second essay, "A Ministry of Justice," delivered before the Associa-
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tion of the Bar of the City of New York and reprinted in the Harvard Law
Review and in the Association's published Lectures on Legal Topics, is a
vitally important contribution to the practical aspects of law reform.
Experience shows the soundness of Judge Cardozo's view that reform will
not proceed of its own. worth and that, if substantial results are to ba
achieved, some agency-perhaps a ministry of justice-must be organized
to foster and to develop it.
Other addresses are: "What Medicine Can Do for Law," delivered before
the New York Academy of Medicine; "The American Law Institute," given
at the Institute's third annual meeting; "The Home of the Law," given at
the dedication of the new home of the New York County Lawyers Associa-
tion; "The Game of the Law and Its Prizes," a commencement address at
the Albany Law School; and "The Comradeship of the Bar," an address
at the, luncheon of the New York University Law School Alumni Asso-
ciation. These, especially the latter ones, show Judge Cardozo in an espe-
cially personal mood and are most attractive. Another great judge and
essayist, Holmes, has referred to somewhat similar writings as "fragments
of my fleece that I have left upon the hedges of life." These fragments
of fleece from the judge most nearly in line with the IHolmes tradition are
an addition to literature, as well as law.
New Haven, Conn. CHARLES E. CLARKC.
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